A Theory of Accounting and Controls for Organizations Producing Public-Versus Private-Goods

10/16/99


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Table of Contents

A Theory of Accounting and Controls for Organizations Producing Public-Versus Private-Goods

Compare Public and Private Good Organizations

Public Good Organizations

Outline

Faculty Teaching by Subject

Calls for Reforms

Four Characteristics of Bureaucracy

PPT Slide

Cries in the Wilderness

Legitimate Reasons for Different Accounting

Lack of Theory of Organizations to Produce Public Goods

A Framework for Contract Theory of Organizations

PPT Slide

PPT Slide

Necessary Conditions

Functions of Accounting

Special Problems in Control of Managers

What are public and private goods?

Pure private goods do not satisfy either condition

Comparing Private and Public Good Organizations

Resource Flows

PPT Slide

PPT Slide

Residual Claims

Stock Market Consequences of Residual Claims

Public Goods Organizations

Defining Managers’ Contracts

Product Market Discipline

Public Good Organizations’ Beneficiaries

Private Good Contract in Public Good Organization

Redistribution of Decision Rights

Product Decision Rights

Product Decision Rights in Public Good Organizations

Investment/Production Decision Rights

Investment/Production Decision Rights in Public Goods Orgs.

Accounting and Controls

Accounting and Control Differences

Entities, Funds and Consolidation

Detail in Public Good Financial Reports

Reports Reflect the Decision Structure

Fixed Assets and Depreciation

Public Good Organizations

Depreciation in Private Good Organizations

In Public Good Organizations

Accruals and Revenue/Expense Recognition

Budgets, Appropriations and Encumbrances

Which one is the Independent Variable?

Considered Polar Cases Only

Bureaucracy As A Dirty Word

Unequal Race

Thank You

Author: BA Faculty

Email: shyam.sunder@yale.edu

Home Page: http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder/research.html