Guideline Questions for Your Experiment
GARP: Consumer Demand and Revealed
Preference Software
ComLabGames
(No programming, use menu to design your experiment)
jMarkets
from Caltech (for running large-scale, internet-based experiments
with multiple simultaneous markets)
LabSEE
Z-Tree Materials: Zipped Package
- Instructions on Using z-tree in
the B74 lab
- Overview
- Tutorial
- z-Tree
- z-Leaf
- Demo Programs (including Double
Auction)
- YouTube Video Demo (on
creating a Public Goods Experiment - see Section 2.2 in Tutorial)
MS Excel Shared Workbook:
- Overview
- Instruction on Using Excel Shared Workbook in the B74 lab and sample spreadsheet
ACE (Agent-Based Computational Economics)
Classroom Experiments (
ESA Session on Classroom Experiments
"A
Classroom Matching Game"
Lisa Anderson (College of William and
Mary), Cathleen
Johnson, Robert Nelson, Liliana Pasyeka, Ragan Petrie, Nidhi
Thakur
"Real Interest Rates and Inflation in the
Classroom"
Sheryl Ball (Virginia Tech), Susan K. Laury
"Internet-Based Classroom Experiments"
Charles A. Holt (University of Virginia)
"Double Marginalization: A Classroom
Experiment"
Narine Badasyan (Virginia Tech), Jacob K. Goeree,
Monica Hartmann, Charles A. Holt, John Morgan, Tanya
Rosenblat (Wesleyan University), Maros Servatka, Dirk
Yandell
"Teaching Nash Equilibrium and Strategy
Dominance: A Classroom Experiment on the Beauty Contest"
Virtudes Alba-Fernandez, Pablo
Brañas-Garza (University of Jaén), Francisca Jimenez-Jimenez,
Javier Rodero-Cosano
Ricardian Explorer (Wesleyan)
Personal Info---Research---Teaching
Instructor:
Shyam Sunder (209,
TA:
Panos Patatoukas (panagiotis.patatoukas@yale.edu)
This
seminar is intended to help the participants develop hands-on experience in
identifying interesting economics questions, designing and conducting economics
experiments and analyzing the data to address those questions. The seminar will meet once a week in
two-hour sessions, and will be organized around articles on the topics listed
below. We may add or delete topics
depending on the interests of the participants.
Besides
readings and analysis of published and working papers, participants will design
and conduct an experiment of their own to address a research question of their
choice. They will write their paper including theory, hypothesis development,
design of experiment, instructions, any software, analysis of results,
conclusions, and possible further explorations. They will present the results
to the class and discuss and defend them.
Course
Number: MGMT 703a (PhD) / ECON 488a (
When:
Fall 2007, Tuesday
Where:
Room B-74,
Recommended
Books: Kagel and Roth,
Instructor
email: shyam.sunder@yale.edu, phone 432 6160
TA
email: panagiotis.patatoukas@yale.edu
Student
level:
Number
of credits: One (1)
1. Experimental Method
2. Auctions
3. Industrial Organization
4. Corporate Finance
5. Game Theory
6. Bargaining
7. Asset Markets
8. Expectations and learning in
monetary economies
9. Public goods
10. Agency and contracts
11. Structural study of
economies using artificial agents
12. Marketing
Guideline Questions to Think About Your
Research Experiment
I would like each member of the class to think about a research experiment you would like to do. It would be useful for you to write down answers to the following questions, and then iterate by revising your answers as you think about each question, discuss it with your colleagues and the instructor. Send me your write up at any stage you wish, and feel free to come and talk to me about it.
1. What is the question you would like to have answered after the experiment? (Your answer should be a single sentence with a question mark at the end.)
2. What do you know already about the possible answers to the question you have stated above?
3. What are the various possible ways of finding an answer to the question you have stated above? Include both experimental as well as any other methods you know about.
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using an experiment to find an answer?
5. How important is this question to YOU? What are the chances that the answer you get from the experiment will surprise you or others? What are the chances that it will change someone’s mind?
6. How would you conduct the experiment? (Write down a design and instructions.)
7. Is your experimental design the simplest possible design to help answer the question you have stated?
8. What are the possible outcomes of the experiment? Do the possible outcomes include at least one outcome that will answer the question you stated above? What is the chance that you will observe this outcome?
At any stage of your thinking, feel free to go back and revise your earlier answers if you wish to.
At any stage of your thinking, feel free to go back and revise your earlier answers if you wish to.
Preliminary Schedule for Fall 2008
Session |
Subject |
Students' Material |
Demonstration/Experiment by |
Location |
|
1 |
Sep 9, 2008 |
Double Auction Demo Design and Data, September 9, 2008 (Excel Workbook) |
Instructor |
B-74 |
|
2 |
Sep 16, 2008 |
First Price, Second Price, and Common Value Auctions, September 16, 2008 (Excel Workbook) Gode, Dhananjay K. and Shyam Sunder, “Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality”, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 1 (February 1993), 119-137. |
Instructor |
B-74 |
|
3 |
Sep 23, 2008 |
Plott and Sunder (1982) Experiment, September 23, 2008 (Excel Workbook) Plott, Charles R. and Shyam Sunder, “Efficiency of Controller Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational Expectation Models,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 4 (August 1982), pp. 663-698. |
Instructor |
B-74 |
|
4 |
Sep 30 , 2008 |
Public Goods Contribution Experiment, Septemer 30, 2008 (Excel Workbook) Public Goods Contribution Experiment, September 30, 2008 (Trade) (Excel Workbook) z-Tree
program (for the demo on Double Auction)
F. A. Hayek, “The
Use of Knowledge in Society”, The American Economic
Review, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Sep., 1945), pp. 519-530. |
Instructor |
B-74 |
|
5 |
Oct 7, 2008 |
|
B-74 |
||
6 |
Oct 14, 2008 |
"Buyers, Sellers & Speculators" |
|
B-74 |
|
7 |
Oct 21, 2008 |
"Fads" |
|
B-74 |
|
8 |
Oct 28, 2008 |
"Pizza tasting experiment" |
|
B-74 |
|
9 |
Nov 4, 2008 |
"Facebook experiment" |
B-74 |
||
10 |
Nov 11, 2008 |
"Health insurance policies" |
B-74 |
||
Nov 18, 2008 |
|||||
|
Fall Recess |
B-74 |
|||
12 |
Dec 2, 2008 | Final
Presentations |
B-74 |
||
***When graduate members of the class present a paper from the literature, you can take up to 60 minutes to conduct a mini-experiment using the members of the class as the subjects and the paper’s experiment as their design. You should then discuss with the class (1) the research question, (2) experimental design, (3) theoretical predictions of experimental outcome, (4) results, and (5) your critique of the authors' conclusions. You may also wish to suggest any improvements in the research design, or use of alternative techniques to find a better answer to the problem. Please discuss any help you need on the experiment with me. This experimental mimicking will be your preparation to design and conduct your own experiment in the later part of the seminar.
(*Priority Readings)
1.
To Protect Its Box-Office Turf, Ticketmaster Plays Rivals' Tune, Wall Street Journal,
2.
For German Firms, New Emission Caps Roil Landscape, Wall Street Journal,
3.
Emissions Pact Stresses Developing Nations' Role, Wall Street Journal,
4.
FCC License Auction Gets Big Bids, Wall Street Journal,
5.
Possibly first field experiment in Old Testament
1.
John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth. The Handbook of Experimental Economics.
2.
Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, 1993. (First textbook on experimental economics).
3.
Daniel Friedman and Shyam Sunder. Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists. Cambridge University Press, 1994. (A how-to book on design, conduct and analysis of experiments).
4.
Daniel Friedman and John Rust. The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theory and Evidence. A Proceedings Volume in the Santa Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity. Addison-Wesley, 1993. (Focuses on double auctions).
5.
Theodore C. Bergstrom and John H. Miller. Experiments with Economic Principles. McGraw-Hill, 1997. (Design and conduct of classroom experiments for teaching accounting principles).
6.
1.
*Shyam Sunder, "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey," in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, A. Roth and John Kagel, eds.,
2.
Forsythe, Robert, Thomas Palfrey, and C.R. Plott, “Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market,” Econometrica Vol. 50, pp. 537-68.
3.
*Plott, Charles R. and Shyam Sunder, “Efficiency of Controller Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational Expectation Models,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 90, No. 4 (August 1982), pp. 663-698. Text (PDF).
4.
Plott, Charles R. and Shyam Sunder, “Rational Expectations and the Aggregation of Diverse Information in Laboratory Security Markets,” Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 5 (September 1988), 1085-1118. Reprinted in Kevin D. Hoover, ed., The Economic Legacy of Robert Lucas, Jr. London: Edward Elger Publishing Ltd.
5.
Sunder, Shyam, “Market for Information: Experimental Evidence,” Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 3 (May 1992), 667-695. Abstract (PDF), Text.(PDF).
6.
Shyam Sunder, “Why Experimental Finance?”, International Conference on Experiments in Economic Sciences,
7.
*Smith, V.L., Gerry Suchanek, and A. W. Williams, “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets,” Econometrica 56(5):1119-51.
8.
Colin Camerer and Keith Wiegelt, "Information Mirages in Experimental Asset Markets", Journal of Business, 64, October 1991, 463-493.
9.
*Shinichi Hirota and Shyam Sunder, "Stock Market as a ‘Beauty Contest’: Investor Beliefs and Price Bubbles sans Dividend Anchors," November 2002. Abstract and Text.
1.
Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Wilfred C. Uecker. 1985. The Methodology of Laboratory Markets and Its Implications for Agency Research in Accounting and Auditing. Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 753-793.
2.
Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm and Wilfred C. Uecker. 1985. “A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship.” Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Supplement), pp. 81-120.
3.
Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Russell J. Lundholm. 1985. “Ripoffs, Lemons, and Reputation Formation in Agency Relationships: A Laboratory Market Study.” Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 809-820.
4.
Douglas V. DeJong and Robert Forsythe. 1992. “A Perspective on the Use of Laboratory Market Experimentation in Auditing Research.” The Accounting Review, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 157-170.
5.
Steven J. Kachelmeier and Mohamed Shehata. 1997. “Internal Auditing and Voluntary Cooperation in Firms: A Cross-Cultural Experiment.” The Accounting Review, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 407-431.
6.
Steven J. Kachelmeier and Ronald R. King. 2002. “Using Laboratory Experiments to Evaluate Accounting Policy Issues.” Accounting Horizons, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 219-232.
1.
Charles A. Holt. 1995. “Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research,” in John Kagel, and Alvin Roth, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2.
Coursey, Don, R. Mark Isaac, and Vernon L. Smith. 1984. “Natural Monopoly and the Contested Markets: Some Experimental Results,” Journal of Law and Economics. 27: 91-113.
3.
Grether, David M. and Charles R. Plott. 1984. “The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case.” Economic Inquiry. 24: 479-507.
4.
Miller, Ross M. and Charles R. Plott. 1985. “Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets.” Econometrica. 53: 837-72.
5.
Isaac, R. Mark and Vernon L. Smith. 1985. “In Search for Predatory Pricing,” Journal of Political Economy. 93: 320-45.
6.
Durham, Yvonne. 2000. “An Experimental Examination of Double Marginalization and Vertical Relationships,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 42, 207-209.
1.
Lave. Lester. 1962. “An Empirical Approach to Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 76: 424-36.
2.
Banks, Jeffrey, Colin Camerer and David Porter. 1994. “An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Experimental Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, 6: 1-31.
3.
Brandts, Jordi, and Charles A. Holt. 1992. “An Experimental Test of Equilibrium Dominance in Signaling Games.” American Economic Review. 82: 1350-65.
4.
Vincent Crawford, "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction," in David Kreps and Ken Wallis, editors, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Seventh World Congress, Vol. I, Econometric Society Monographs No. 27, Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 206-242; reprinted with minor changes and additions in Colin Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, editors, Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. (PDF).
5.
Vincent P. Crawford, "Introduction to Experimental Game Theory" (Symposium), Journal of Economic Theory 104 (May 2002), 1-15.
Agent-Based Economies
Auctions
Monetary Economics and Coordination
Accounting and Agency
1.
Fouraker, Lawrence E. and Sidney Siegel. 1963. Bargaining Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.
2.
Roth, Alvin. 1995. “Bargaining Experiments,” in John Kagel, and Alvin Roth, eds. The Handbook of Experimental Economics.” Princton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
3.
Lin, Haijin and Shyam Sunder, 2002. “Using Experimental Data to Model Bargaining Behavior in Ultimatum Games,” in Rami Zwick and Amnon Rapoport, eds. Experimental Business Research. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, pp. 373-97.
4.
Timothy Cason and Stanley Reynolds. 2005. “Bounded Rationality in Laboratory Bargaining with Asymmetric Information,” Economic Theory 25, pp. 553-574.
Marketing